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Abstract
We argue that the standard toolbox used in electoral studies to assess the
bias and responsiveness of electoral systems can also be used to assess the
bias and responsiveness of legislative systems. We consider which items in
the toolbox are the most appropriate for use in the legislative setting, then
apply them to estimate levels of bias in the U.S. House from 1879 to 2000.
Our results indicate a systematic bias in favor of the majority party over
this period, with the strongest bias arising during the period of “Czar rule”
(51st-60th Congresses, 1889-1910) and during the post-packing era (87th-106th
Congresses, 1961-2000). This finding is consistent with the majority party
possessing a significant advantage in setting the agenda.
“The definition of alternatives is the supreme instrument of power.”
–E. E. Schattschneider (1960, p. 86).
The U.S. House of Representatives, like other legislatures, takes official actions pur-
suant to formal motions proposed by its members. Each motion is voted upon, either
implicitly (e.g., an appeal for unanimous consent) or explicitly (e.g., a voice vote). Votes
on the most important motions are usually roll call votes in which each member’s decision
is a matter of public record.
Congressional parties can affect legislative decisions on the floor in two basic ways.
First, they can influence how members vote on the various motions put to the House.
Second, they can influence what motions are offered for the House’s consideration to
begin with. In this paper, we focus on the latter issue — and particularly on the agenda
power of the majority party.
∗Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093-0521;
gcox@weber.ucsd.edu
†Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA
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The paper begins, in the next section, by elaborating an analogy between voting
to choose between candidates in an election and voting to choose between alternatives
in a roll call. The literature on gerrymandering suggests that the party controlling
redistricting in a particular state has both the motive and the opportunity to rig the
translation of votes into seats in its own favor, producing what is technically called
partisan bias. The literature on agenda power suggests that the party controlling the
agenda in a particular Congress has both the motive and the opportunity to rig the
translation of votes into decisions in its own favor — again producing partisan bias.
After setting up the basic analogy, we argue that the standard toolbox used in electoral
studies to assess the bias and responsiveness of electoral systems can also be used to assess
the bias and responsiveness of legislative systems. We consider which items in the toolbox
are the most appropriate for use in the legislative setting, then apply them to estimate
levels of bias in the U.S. House from 1879 to 2000. Our results indicate a systematic bias
in favor of the majority party over this period, with the strongest bias arising during the
period of “Czar rule” (51st-60th Congresses, 1889-1910) and during the post-packing era
(87th-106th Congresses, 1961-2000).
1. VOTES AND DECISIONS
In a typical U.S. congressional election, a set of voters is presented with a choice between
two candidates, one Republican and one Democrat. In a typical congressional roll call
vote, a set of legislators is presented with a choice between two alternatives, the state
that would obtain were the motion accepted and the state that would obtain were the
motion rejected. In both the electoral and legislative example, each chooser has just one
vote to cast and the alternative receiving the most votes wins (we exclude from analysis
votes on veto overrides and other motions in the U.S. House that require a 2
3
approval to
pass).1
The consequence of winning in an election is that one party gets a seat in the House
and the other fails to get this seat. The consequence of winning in a legislative vote is
more complex. If the two parties take the same position (either for or against) a motion,
then both win.2 If the two parties take opposite positions then, as in the election, one
wins and one loses. In what follows, we focus on the cases of party disagreement.
1In the legislative setting, ties are broken in favor of the “no” position. Ties in the electoral arena
are broken in various ways.
2In the electoral arena, this would be like a fusion candidate (a nominee of both major parties)
running unopposed (something we ignore).
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1.1. Responsiveness and bias in electoral voting processes
Students of elections have a long-standing interest in how votes map into seats. Within
a single district, the answer is transparent: a party’s seat share is zero, if it secures less
than 50% of the two-party vote; and one, if it secures more than 50% (we ignore ties).
Aggregating across all the districts in a legislature, the votes-to-seats mapping becomes
more complex and is usually described in terms of two key parameters: responsiveness
and bias.
Responsiveness refers to how much a party’s aggregate seat share responds to changes
in its aggregate vote share. To be concrete, let s denote the share of all seats that a party
wins in a given state legislature (elected in single-member districts by plurality rule);
and v denote the average vote share garnered by the party’s candidates in the various
districts within the state.3 If all the districts in a state are “safe” for one party or the
other, then the statewide vote share may change (moderately) yet produce no change in
the statewide seat share. This would be an example of low responsiveness. In contrast, if
all the districts in a state are closely contested by the two parties, then a small statewide
vote swing may produce a very large change in the parties’ seat shares — an example of
large responsiveness.
Bias refers to an advantage for one party in the efficiency with which its votes translate
into seats. For example, if a state legislature has been gerrymandered by the Republicans,
there may be a few extremely safe Democratic districts and a large number of just-
winnable Republican districts. In this state, the Democrats “pay” a lot in votes for each
seat they win, while the Republicans “pay” substantially less per seat won. Put another
way, the Republicans have arranged the districts so that they win by a little and lose by
a lot, thereby increasing the number of seats they can eke out of a given expected vote.
The standard equation used to represent (and to estimate) the levels of responsiveness
and bias, given statewide vote (v) and seat (s) shares, is the seats-vote curve:
s
1− s
= exp (λ)
(
v
1− v
)ρ
(1)
where the parameter ρ represents responsiveness, and λ represents bias.4 This specific
functional form generalizes the classic cube law (Kendall and Stuart 1950), which emerges
when λ = 0 and ρ = 3.
Examples of seats-vote curves can be found in Figure 1. To see the effect of respon-
siveness, ρ, it is simplest to assume no bias (λ = 0). In this case, ρ = 1 corresponds to
“proportional representation”: a party can expect to get a statewide seat share equal to
3An alternative is to define v as the total number of votes received statewide, expressed as a share of
the two-party statewide vote total.
4For discussions of bias and responsiveness in elections using this equation, see King and Browning
(1987), King (1990), and Campagna and Grofman (1990).
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its statewide vote share. Values of ρ larger than one imply larger seat bonuses for the
party winning more votes statewide; that is, the vote-richer party’s seat share exceeds its
vote share.5 Positive values of ρ smaller than one imply larger and larger seat bonuses
for the party winning fewer votes statewide; that is, the vote-poorer party’s seat share
exceeds its vote share. Finally, if ρ = 0, then seat shares are completely unrelated to
vote shares.
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Figure 1: Examples of Seats-Votes Curves with varying values of ρ and λ = 0
The effect of bias, λ, is simpler. As λ increases, the favored party’s seat share in-
creases, as long as v > 0. In terms of the Figure 1, λ causes the curve to shift right for
positive values and left for negative ones. That is, non-zero values of λ cause the electoral
system to favor one of the parties in the translation of votes into seats.
5A larger bonus for the vote-richer party also implies a larger slope near v = 0.5 — that is, greater
responsiveness of seat shares to vote shares.
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1.2. Responsiveness and bias in legislative voting processes
Both responsiveness and bias can be defined in the legislative setting as well. To see
how, first consider how to define the variables, seats (s) and votes (v) in the seats-votes
equation above.
In the electoral context, the variable v is the average, across all the districts of a given
state, of the vote share garnered by the Democratic candidate. In the legislative context,
v is the average, across all “party” votes occurring in a given Congress, of the vote share
garnered by the “Democratic position.” A “party” vote is one that pits majorities of
the two parties against one another (one favoring the motion, one opposing) and the
“Democratic position” is whichever side of the question a majority of Democrats favor.
In the electoral context, the variable s is the share of times that Democratic candidates
in a given state win. In the legislative context, s is the share of times that Democratic
positions in a given Congress win (where the denominator is restricted to “party” votes).6
Having defined the variables in the legislative arena, one is in a position to estimate
the votes-to-seats equation by one of the several techniques on offer in the electoral
studies literature. We consider the best estimation option later, simply noting now that
it is possible to estimate both responsiveness (ρ) and bias (λ) for legislative binary vote
data.
2. WHY WE SHOULD EXPECT MAJORITY-PARTY BIAS IN ELECTORAL
VOTES
Many scholars argue that the party in control of redistricting in a state will engineer
bias in its own favor. Cox and Katz (2002), for example, view responsiveness and bias
as properties of state districting laws. Each such law has the potential to recombine the
voters in a state into different districts, thereby affecting the number of marginal and
safe districts and their distribution between the two parties. Districting plans that create
more safe districts across the board will exhibit lower responsiveness. Districting plans
that give one party a markedly higher safe-seat-to-marginal-seat ratio than the other will
exhibit bias.
The usual method by which partisan effects in redistricting are detected is to allow
bias (λ) to be a function of which party controls the redistricting. States in which the
Republicans control both houses of the state assembly and the governorship, and hence
control the redistricting process, are expected to exhibit pro-Republican bias, with just
the opposite expectation for states in which the Democrats are in control. Empirically,
6Note that the seats won in the electoral context are plausibly equally valuable but the victories won
in the legislative context can vary widely in importance. Nonetheless, lacking any way to systematically
assess importance, we count all victories equally here — and compute a simple victory share.
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Cox and Katz (2002) and Engstrom (2003) find considerable support for this line of
reasoning over most of U.S. electoral history.7
3. WHY WE SHOULD EXPECT MAJORITY-PARTY BIAS IN LEGISLATIVE
VOTES
We highlight two arguments in the literature that, although not framed explicitly in terms
of bias, nonetheless lead one to predict bias in favor of the party that sets up the agenda
process in the U.S. House — i.e., the majority party. Each is somewhat similar to the
argument that the party controlling the redistricting process will benefit from electoral
bias in its favor.
3.1. Agenda manipulation
First, Cox and McCubbins (2002) argue that the majority party always has the power
to block the consideration of issues on the House floor, while the minority sometimes
does not (depending mostly on the membership of the Rules Committee in a particular
Congress).8 This differential power to block, when it arises, will produce pro-majority
party bias.
To see how, consider a simple spatial model. We will assume that the legislators
possess single peaked preferences with ideal points along N left-right issue dimensions.
Along these N issue dimensions there are pre-defined status quo points, which we will
denote q1, . . . , qn. These are the policies that will be implemented if no new bill is passed
on the given dimension. Assuming that members have additively separable preferences
across the dimensions, we can consider each in isolation. Denote the median majority-
party member on the jth issue by Mj, the median House member by Hj, and the median
minority-party member by mj. Given a Democratic Congress, one can assume that
Mj < Hj < mj. Now suppose that qj lies between Mj and Hj. The majority-party
leaders can foresee that bringing a bill to the floor to change qj can only lead to a
rightward policy change (to Hj) that will displease a majority of Democrats. Thus, if
they can prevent the consideration of this particular issue dimension, they will. A similar
point holds for the minority and issue dimensions on which qj lies between Hj and mj:
the minority will, if it can, block consideration of such issues.9
7For broader reviews of literature on redistricting, see Butler and Cain (1992), McDonald (1999) and
Cox and Katz (2002).
8Other scholars who emphasize the agenda power of the majority party include Aldrich and Rohde
(2000) and Sinclair (2002).
9To be more precise, a party will block a bill that will foreseeably defeat it on the floor from being
brought up as a stand-alone measure. Possibly, the bill can be packaged in an omnibus proposal that is
acceptable to the blocking party. We assume, however, that a simple log-roll — a sequence of votes on
which promises are made to trade votes — is not credible.
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Now consider a Congress in which only the majority has a reliable power to block. In
such a Congress, all dimensions with status quo points, qj, between Mj and Hj will be
blocked—because, as noted above, dealing with such issues can only lead to rightward
policy moves.10 Dimensions with status quo points, qj, between 2Mj −Hj and Mj may
be considered, if the majority can secure a closed rule, but will otherwise be blocked.
All other issues will be considered and actual policy changes will be voted through. The
effect of this pattern of agenda manipulation is to prevent narrow defeats of the majority
party. In the same Congress, since the minority cannot (by assumption) block, issues
with status quo points between Hj and mj will be considered and will produce narrow
defeats of the minority party. This asymmetry in narrow defeats produces pro-majority
bias, varying in size depending on how many issues with status quo points in the censored
[Mj, Hj] and uncensored [Hj,mj] regions there are.
Now consider a Congress — perhaps in the period 1937-1960, during which the Rules
Committee has been characterized as controlled by a conservative coalition—in which
both the majority and minority party have some power to block.11 In this Congress,
status quo points in both the region [Mj, Hj] and the region [Hj,mj] will be blocked
(and possibly others as well, depending on the ability of various actors to commit to
closed rules). This will prevent narrow defeats for both the majority and the minority
party, so that no systematic effect on bias is predicted.
Bias in favor of a given party arises when that party wins by a little and loses by a lot,
relative to the other party. Thus, bias is a joint product of the ability to block—avoiding
narrow defeats of one’s party; and the ability to push—forcing through legislation in the
teeth of the minority’s strenuous opposition (and hence producing narrow victories).12
We thus expect pro-majority bias to arise in those Congresses in which the majority
possessed both the ability to block what would have become narrow defeats and the
ability to push through to sometimes narrow victories. In other words, pro-majority bias
should arise when there is both an agenda cartel (per Cox and McCubbins 2002) and
conditional party government is more visible (Aldrich and Rohde 2000). The Congresses
that best fit this description are the czar-rule Congresses at the turn of the twentieth
century; and the post-packing Congresses (1961 – present). In the empirical work below,
we will test whether these periods stand out in terms of detectable bias.
10Note that an issue with qj between Mj and Hj will, if voted on under an open rule, produce a bill
at Hj which passes when pitted against qj . However, all members to the left of (
(Hj+qj)
2 > Mj will vote
against the bill. The bill will nonetheless pass, producing a narrow defeat of the majority party, at least
half of whose members vote against the bill. If the issue comes up with a bill proposing a leftward policy
move, and a special rule preventing rightward amendments, then it will simply fail to pass.
11We imagine that the majority’s power to block derives from its possession of key posts, such as
committee chairs, while the minority’s power to block depends on forming alliances with some majority
members.
12Equivalently, bias is a joint product of asymmetric blocking power (one party having it, one party
lacking it).
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3.2. Vote options
A second argument that leads to a similar conclusion begins with the supposition that
the majority party, when it chooses bills to put on the agenda, anticipates that it will
need to “buy” some votes on the margin—and then buys just enough to win. More
specifically, King and Zeckhauser (2001) argue that the majority party will typically not
buy votes but instead will buy vote options. That is, the Speaker will line up members
who are willing to sell their votes to the majority, if necessary to produce victory. When
the majority can eke out a victory by exercising its options, it does so and produces
a close victory. When the majority is too far short of votes, then there is no point in
exercising any of its options; it thus loses by a lot.
If both the majority and minority party were equally able to line up vote options, then
there would be no reason to expect bias. However, it is the majority party leadership,
not the minority leadership, that is typically credited in the literature with the ability to
win close votes. Bauer, Pool and Dexter (1963, 432), for example, put it this way: “The
[majority] leadership usually has enough of a reservoir of political credit to have a few
votes switched if it would otherwise lose by a narrow margin.” To the extent that such
claims are correct, one should expect a pro-majority bias in congressional votes.
3.3. Ideological drift
A third way in which pro-majority bias might arise does not relate to any procedural
advantage possessed by that party. Suppose that the Democrats become the majority
party after a narrow electoral victory. Thereafter, the House drifts steadily leftward and
the Democrats maintain their majority. In this scenario of “ideological drift,” most of the
status quo points that each House faces will be to the right of the current House median
(because they are near the old House median which is by hypothesis to the right of the
current median). The majority Democrats will consequently win a lot in each House. The
reason, however, is the continually favorable location of the status quo points, not any
agenda-setting advantages. Such a pattern does not appear to characterize the modern
House but we control for this possibility in the analysis below in any event.
4. ESTIMATING THE VOTES-TO-DECISIONS EQUATION IN THE HOUSE
Our data consist of all recorded votes from the U.S. House of Representatives in the
46th − −106th Congresses (1879–2000). We exclude votes that require a 2
3
majority for
passage (such as suspension of the rules). We also exclude the vote on election of the
Speaker and all votes on which the two parties were in agreement (i.e., majorities of
both parties voted in the same manner). For the remaining votes—votes on motions
requiring a simple majority for passage and on which the two parties were opposed—we
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calculate the percentage of the total vote cast for the “Democratic” position and whether
the Democratic position prevailed. Averaging across each Congress, we then compute
the average vote share garnered by the “Democratic” position, DV ; the number of all
motions that the Democrats won; and the total number of motions voted on (meeting
our criteria). 13
We use these data to estimate the parameters, ρ and λ, defined in Equation 1. This
is done by solving for s in terms of v, yielding
s(v|ρ, λ) =
[
1 + exp
(
−λ− ρ ln
(
v
1− v
))]−1
. (2)
This is the standard grouped logit model with a single independent variable, ln(v/(1−v)),
the natural logarithm of the ratio of the average vote share. We actually will allow the
bias to differ between Democratic and Republican controlled congresses. In order to
account for possible un-modeled heterogeneity we use the extended beta binomial model
that generalized the grouped loget model (cf. Palmquist 1999). Complete details of the
estimation can be found in Appendix A. From our analysis, we can compute the bias
in favor of the majority party (which we shall take as positively signed, with negative
values indicating pro-minority bias).14
We have analyzed bias in the entire time period from 1879–2000 and in four sub-
periods: (1) the pre-Reed Congresses (1879–1890);15 (2) the Czar-rule Congresses (1889–
1910); (3) the post-Cannon Congresses (1911–1961); and (4) the post-packing Congresses
(1961-2000). The four sub-periods were chosen to correspond to major organizational
watersheds identified in the previous literature. In particular, we use the following land-
marks to define our periods: the adoption of Reed’s Rules in 1890; the revolt against
Speaker Cannon in 1910; and the packing of the Rules Committee in 1961.
The landmarks we have chosen as demarcating our periods stand out in the previous
literature as the logical choices. This is obvious enough for the first two, Reed’s Rules
and the revolt against Cannon (see, e.g., Galloway and Wise 1976), but let us say a few
words about the last. Before the Rules Committee was packed with additional liberal
members after the 1960 election, standard sources view it as independent of the majority
party (and, indeed, dominated by a conservative coalition of Southern Democrats and
13It has been suggested that part of the change we document below maybe due to a shift in the
composition of the votes we include in our analysis. In particular, in the recent congresses include votes
on amendment and procedural motions. However, we note that the set of recorded votes are endogenous
under the maintained hypothesis of majority party agenda control and therefore does not pose a problem
for our analysis.
14We do not discuss the overdispersion parameter estimated in the extended beta binomial model
below. One interpretation of it in our context is that there are positive correlations between formally
different roll call votes, as when the House votes on essentially the same issue in slightly different guise
(e.g., previous question, rule adoption, tabling motion, final passage).
15. Ideally, we would include more pre-Reed Congresses. However, including Congresses before the
46th enters a much different congressional world, in which the southern representatives are largely or
wholly absent.
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Republicans). Afterwards, the majority’s control was improved but standard accounts
stress that Rules continued to be largely independent of the majority party until further
reforms in 1975 (see Rohde 1991, p. 25; Peabody 1963; Oppenheimer 1977). Nonetheless,
Cox and Poole (2001) find that party pressures on procedural (and especially special rule
adoption) votes increased after 1961, while Cox and McCubbins (2003) find that, relative
to other procedural motions, the majority party became abruptly more likely to win on
special rule adoption votes after 1961, and the minority party abruptly more likely to
lose. We have thus chosen to pool the 1961-73 period with the post-reform period, rather
than with the previous period.
5. RESULTS FOR THE U.S. HOUSE, 1879–2000
Our numerical results can be found in Table 1. A graph of the “victories-votes” curve —
i.e., the seats-votes curve with the legislative data—estimated for the full time period,
1879-2000, is displayed in Figure 2. The solid line is for Democratic Congresses and the
dashed line is for Republican ones. We have also included the actual data points used
to estimate the curves. As can be seen, the estimated responsiveness nearly follows the
classic cube law since the curves are nearly perfectly S-shaped, with a value of 3.45; while
estimated bias in favor of the majority party is 6.5, statistically significant at the.01 level.
A bias of this size means that, were the majority party to average 50% of the vote in
a series of roll calls, it would expect to win 56.5% of them. Somehow, the majority is
getting more bang for its buck: more legislative victories for its legislative votes.
Table 1: Bias and Responsiveness in U.S. House of Representatives Roll Call Voting,
1879–2000
Period Bias Responsiveness
1879–1888 0.06 2.59
(3.33) (0.51)
1889–1910 35.55 0.01
(2.95) (0.45)
1911–1960 2.91 3.76
(2.42) (0.37)
1961–2000 6.48 3.45
(2.11) (0.33)
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis
below the estimate.
Breaking the analysis into the four sub-periods noted above we find some stark differ-
ences. Responsiveness is relatively high in the first, third and fourth periods — 2.59, 3.76
and 3.45, respectively. However, in the second period, it falls to virtually nil (0.01). Bias,
meanwhile, is positive (pro-majority-party) in all periods but small and insignificant prior
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Figure 2: Victories-Vote Curve for Congressional Roll Calls from 1877 to 2000. The
solid line is the curve for Democratic Congress and the dashed line is for Republican
Congresses. The data points used to estimate the curves are denoted by the points marked
“D” and “R”.
to Reed’s rules (0.06)16; very large in the czar-rule Congresses (35.55)17; moderate in the
16The pre-Reed Congresses appear to have been level playing fields with no pro-majority bias to speak
of. Cf. Den Hartog (2003).
17The czar-rule Congresses appear to have been very tilted playing fields in which the majority won
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post-Cannon Congresses (2.91); and very near the overall level of bias (noted in Table 1)
in the post-packing Congresses (6.48). By and large, these results fit with conventional
accounts of these Congresses. More importantly, they gibe with what one would expect
from Cox and McCubbins’ cartel model: bias is insignificant when the minority’s proce-
dural hand is good (pre-Reed and post-Cannon); but it is significant when the minority’s
procedural hand is poor (in the czar-rule and post-packing Congresses).
As a check on the robustness of our results, we added an additional control variable,
tapping changes in the location of the House median. The rationale for this variable
(which simply subtracts the t − 1 House median from the t House median) is that the
status quo policies should be near the lagged House median. Suppose that the House
moves rightward between t− 1 and t. This will mean that the House at time t will face
a fair number of left-of-median status quo policies. Dealing with them should produce
rightist victories and may increase pro-right bias. Thus, for example, when the Republi-
cans took over the House in 1994, one might attribute the observed pro-Republican bias
to the fact that there were many leftist status quo policies to change, rather than to the
majority party’s ability to manipulate the agenda or buy votes on the margin to secure
victory.
Including a variable equal to the change in the House median from t − 1 to t does
not change any of the results reported above. Thus, one can more confidently attribute
pro-majority bias to something the majority does, rather than to a consistent pattern of
change in the House median that favors the majority party.
6. CONCLUSION
Parties, whether electoral or legislative, seek to win enough votes to attain “victory.”
Electoral victories produce control over legislative seats (and other offices). Legislative
victories can be as small as fending off a dilatory motion or as large as passing a major
piece of legislation. In both arenas, attracting more support in one vote expends resources
that could otherwise be used to attract more support in another vote. Thus, in both
arenas, parties wish to use their votes efficiently, winning victories at the cheapest possible
price in manufactured votes. One can use standard statistical analyses, such as those
employed in this paper, to detect any partisan bias — which will arise if one party is
systematically more efficient in its translation of votes into victories.
In this paper, we have estimated the bias in congressional votes over the period 1879–
2000. What we find is consistent with the cartel theory of how majority parties in the
U.S. House operate (Cox and McCubbins 1993; 2002; 2003). When the majority party
is both able to block bills it does not like (virtually always) and to push bills it does like
significantly more victories than one would expect based on its vote share alone. Indeed, the low
estimated responsiveness suggests that majorities were winning at a constant rate, regardless of their
size and average vote share.
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against the minority’s opposition (in the czar-rule and post-packing Congresses), then it
is able to both avoid narrow defeats and generate narrow victories. This means bias in
its favor in the translation of votes into victories.
The primary weakness of our method for detecting majority-party agenda-setting
advantages is its reliance on highly aggregated data, as is also the case in electoral studies
using this method. Other techniques for detecting majority-party advantages rely on a
more disaggregated analysis of roll call voting data than we provide here. For example,
Sinclair (2002) focuses on how members’ votes change between the adoption of a special
rule for consideration of a particular bill, and the final passage of that bill. Lawrence,
Maltzmann and Smith (2003) and Cox and McCubbins (2002; 2003) similarly rely on
features of roll call voting that can be analyzed within a given Congress. In contrast
to these more disaggregated approaches, our method focuses more clearly on changes
in the main independent variable: majority status. (The other studies necessarily hold
this constant when applied to a single Congress, although pooling across Congresses does
allow majority status to vary and hence the effects of such variation to be explored.)
Our technique is general and could in principle be applied to any legislature. How-
ever, we note that it will yield indeterminate results in some cases of very strong party
government. In the U.K., for example, the majority party will typically win a very high
percentage of all votes, regardless of its share of the seats; and it will hold most of its
members on every vote. The consequence of this is a pattern of data that can be “fit”
by a statistical model in either of two ways: zero responsiveness and high pro-majority
bias; or high responsiveness and zero bias.
A. ESTIMATION
In this appendix we consider estimation of Equation (1). As written the equation is
deterministic and can not directly be used to estimate the parameters of interest from
observed data. However, if we assume a stochastic model — following King and Brown-
ing (1987; see also King 1990) — then Equation (1) defines the expected portion of
Democratic victories in Congress t:
E[st] =
[
1 + eλ
(
vt
1− vt
)ρ]−1
=
[
1 + exp
(
−λ− ρ ln
(
vi,t
1− vi,t
))]−1
.
(3)
The second expression for the expected seat proportion is same as the mean function for
the standard logit model for grouped data with a constant, λ, and a single independent
variable, ln( vt
1−vt
). If we were to further assume that the probability of the Democrats
winning a district were independently and identically distributed, we could model the
process with a binomial distribution. The binomial assumption and Equation (3) then set
up a standard grouped logit model that we could estimate either via maximum likelihood
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(as in King and Browning 1987) or two-step minimum Chi-Square methods (see Greene
1993:653–657 or Maddala 1983:28–34).
However, we suspect that there is still some un-modeled heterogeneity — beyond that
being picked up by the logistic of the vote shares — and possibly some correlation in
the probabilities across districts. In fact, an optimal partisan gerrymander would require
such heterogeneity across districts. Assuming that there were not enough partisan voters
for the dominant party to win every district, there would be two types of districts in
the state: a handful that the minority party wins overwhelmingly and the remaining
districts in which the dominant party wins but not by huge margins. In order to handle
this we assume that the seat shares follow an extended beta-binomial, instead of a stan-
dard binomial distribution. The extended beta-binomial is generated by assuming that
the probability (from a binomial model) that a district is won by the democrats varies
according to a beta distribution.18 Let St be the number of roll-calls the Democrats win
in Congress t and Nt the total number of party votes in t. The extended beta-binomial
can then be written as
f(St|pii, γ) =
Nt!
St!(Nt − St)!
∏St−1
j=0 (pii + γj)
∏Nt−St−1
j=0 (1− pii + γj)∏Nt−1
j=0 (1 + γj),
where we assume the convention that if any of the constituent products are negative,
then the term is set to 1. Note that since we are explicitly conditioning on Nt, the model
incorporates the heteroskedastity caused by the varying number of votes across years in
our sample.
The parameter pit is the average probability that a given roll-call in Congress t is won
by the Democrats. Thus,
pii =
E[Si,t]
Ni
= E[si,t].
So we can use Equation 3 to model the systematic variation in the underlying probability.
The parameter γ captures the amount that pit varies over the Congresses or the correlation
between roll-calls. If γ is zero, then the extended-binomial is just the binomial and roll-
calls are identically and independently distributed. If γ > 0, there is positive correlation
between roll-calls and when γ < 0 there is negative correlation between roll-calls.
The log likelihood is straight-forward to derive assuming independence across Con-
gresses. The contribution of each Congress t, ignoring terms that do not depend on the
parameters, is
Lt(pit, γ|St, Nt) ∝
St−1∑
j=0
(pit + γj) +
Nt−St−1∑
j=0
(1− pit + γj)−
Nt−1∑
j=0
(1 + γj).
We then substitute Equation 3 for pit to get Lt(λ, ρ, γ|St, Nt, vt). The likelihood for the
entire sample is found by summing the Lt across the Congresses.
18See King 1989:45–48 for a complete derivation of the extended beta-binomial distribution.
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